EMERSON, COOLEY, AND THE AMERICAN HEROIC VISION*

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Willful leaders and mindless masses are governing images in Carlyle’s and Nietzsche’s romantic conception of political domination. In contrast, the nineteenth century American notion of heroic leadership was inspired by liberal sentiment and drew mainly on classical republican definitions of greatness. These sentiments and definitions supplied the basis for Ralph Waldo Emerson’s theory of heroes and hero worship. The first part of this paper shows how the tension between elitist and democratic conceptions of the hero permeated Emerson’s early work, and how this tension was finally resolved in his essays on representative men. The second part of the paper deals with Charles Horton Cooley’s admiration of Emerson, and the affinity between Emerson’s mature ideas and Cooley’s studies of genius, emulation, fame, and leadership. Cooley’s political sociology, like Emerson’s, was based on a profound attachment to democratic principles. Cooley also believed, as did Emerson, that these intangible principles only remain secure as long as society emulates the great men who personify them. Building upon Emerson’s conception of the heroic figure as a symbol rather than a source of social order and social change, Cooley passed on to later generations of American sociologists a conception of heroic leadership that differs sharply from the romantic visions which prevailed in Europe from Emerson’s time to Cooley’s own day.

The present commemoration of America’s founding period began in 1976, the two hundredth anniversary of the Declaration of Independence, and will end in 1988 with the bicentennial observance of the Constitution’s ratification. This commemorative period has occasioned much reflection by social scientists on the great men who affirmed and protected the nation’s independence and political ideals. Throughout this period, however, sociologists have found themselves with little to say. In my opinion, this uncharacteristic silence betrays a deficiency that is rooted in the history of sociology itself. Specifically, the major sociological conceptions of great men are drawn from an intellectual tradition that is foreign to the realities of democracy.

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Inspired by the romantic virtues of energy, will, and original genius, Thomas Carlyle and Friedrich Nietzsche helped create in Europe the intellectual climate for inquiries into the social functions of the hero. Among the controlling images arising from these works are Gustav LeBon's hypnotic demagogue, Robert Michels' hero-bureaucrat whose "extraordinary congenital qualities" energize entire nations, and, above all, Max Weber's "charismatic leader," whose genius and will break through the inertia of history itself. The continuing influence of these works—Weber's in particular—is reflected in the studies of fascist leaders, carried out mainly by Europeans immediately before and after World War II (see, for example, Neumann, 1941; Gerth, 1940; Erikson, 1942; Fromm, 1941; Adorno, 1951), and in Anglo-American research appearing in the 1960's on the role of charismatic leaders in the emergence of the new Third World states (see Apter, 1968; Dow, 1968; Friedland; 1964, Runciman, 1963; among others). Concerned in both instances with leadership in authoritarian contexts, these inquiries lent weight to Daniel Bell's (1965: 396) observation that "the image of the mindless masses and the image of the strong-willed leader . . . enjoy largely unquestioned acceptance throughout social theory."

In the democratic setting, such images carry little conviction. Relying on the will of numerical majorities as a basis for law and effective government, democratic theorists have assumed that heroic leaders are subversive of self-rule. The cult of the hero, observed Daniel Boorstin, has always "carried with it contempt for democracy. Hero worship, from Plato to Carlyle, was often a dogma of anti-democracy." American democracy, Boorstin adds, is particularly suspicious of, if not embarrassed by, the hero. Lacking strong, aristocratic traditions, and disdaining unconditional obedience and deference, American democracy is said to be inconsistent in principle with the cult of heroic leadership (Boorstin, 1960: 50).

In fact, Americans have not only produced and venerated many heroic leaders; they have also supplied persuasive rationales for doing so. Convinced that fame, not power, was the proper reward for public service, American thinkers of the late eighteenth century regarded the veneration of revolutionary leaders as a duty. They believed that veneration was the only incentive for disinterested men to assume positions of public trust (Adair, 1974; Wills, 1984: 128–129). But collective approbation was always more than a pragmatic device to bring good men into influential positions; it was also a medium for the expression of social and political values. Transforming revolutionary leaders into national heroes, the Americans created emblems of their own self-conception. It was this "symbolic" as opposed to "instrumental" function of the hero that occupied the minds of nineteenth century thinkers. At the very time European writers were formulating an expressly authoritarian conception of hero worship, there developed in the United States an effort to reconcile hero worship to democracy on this new, symbolic, basis. Despite its recent neglect, the latter formulation continues to make intelligible Americans' cultural and political preferences. My aim is to recover the substance of this indigenous perspective and to articulate its connection with the history of symbolic interactionism.

THE DEMOCRATIC CULT OF HERO WORSHIP

Between the 1880's and 1920's, Gary Hamilton and John Sutton observe, American sociologists (many of whom received academic training in Europe) struggled to achieve a
solution to the problem of political domination in a complex democratic society. Committed to the ideal of "self-regulation," these writers recognized that their approach differed from the absolutist solutions of the Europeans. The early American sociologists had discovered that social control is inherent in social organization itself (or, more concretely, in the social roles within which the self is developed) and concluded that order could be achieved without coercive institutions or powerful leaders. These men believed that "a system predicated on self-regulation does not acknowledge the legitimacy of the master's hand, however nearby it may be; there is no Herrschaft, no legitimate external source of command. In principle, command had to be internalized, had to be present in the form of duties that one is morally obliged to fulfill" (Hamilton and Sutton, 1983: 49).2

It was in this intellectual context that Charles Horton Cooley, one of the great founders of American sociology, worked out his conception of heroes and hero worship (a conception that he deemed central to his work).3 In the self-regulated society, Cooley believed, heroes are aides to the internalization of social norms. The hero is not an instrument, but an antidote, to coercion; not a master but a servant whose function is to represent and, by example, reinforce the values and aspirations of his time. Assuming great men to be symbols rather than sources of society's existing tendencies, Cooley's was the first sociological effort to render hero worship intelligible to democracy. In this effort he drew heavily, if not exclusively, on the writings of Ralph Waldo Emerson.

Emerson's own conception of the hero is derived from his ethics, which celebrates the virtues of men who act in the light of ideal morality and not the prevailing norms of their community. If these great men promote moral idealism, it is because of the contagiousness of their actions, and if their actions are contagious is because they are, in the most fundamental sense, symbolic. Moving from Swedenborg's belief that all material things "correspond" to spiritual things and symbolize them, Emerson concluded that "we are symbols and inhabit symbols ... workmen, work, and tools, words and things, birth and death, all are emblems" (for detail, see Arvin, 1966). Since all knowledge of the world is a knowledge of symbols, all tangible men—especially heroic men—become, for Emerson, dramatizers of spirit as well as agents of action. In Cooley's later notion of the symbolic hero we will find clear traces of this transcendentalist doctrine.

Transcendentalism may have no inherent affinity with democratic ideals, but it did supply categories through which Emerson and his disciple, Cooley, articulated the democratic cult of the hero. That these men harnessed their theories to a political end is not a matter of inference; they were explicit in their determination to understand the role of great men in a democratic society, and they took pains to distinguish their own formulations from those of Carlyle and Nietzsche. By comparing and contrasting some foundational concepts in Emerson's and Cooley's writings, we can appreciate what they accomplished, and, in so doing, gain insight into an important but neglected phase in the history of American sociological thought.

We turn first to Emerson and his legacy.

THE REPUBLICAN HERO

Like other transcendentalists, Emerson was strongly attracted to the European romantic movement, whose ideas first reached New England during the late 1820's and early 1830's. From Wordsworth and Coleridge, Emerson learned about the rhetoric and philos-
ophy of romanticism; from Carlyle, he learned about its political implications. Emerson was sympathetic to the romantic critique of bourgeois democracy. Like Carlyle, he saw in the commercialism of the rising middle class a subversion of high aesthetic and moral values. During the Jacksonian era, especially, he deplored the investment of power in the ill-bred, immoral, and unintelligent. Despite his faith in the potential greatness of all men, Emerson’s preoccupation with the hero inhered partly in his disdain for the common man’s failure to become what he could be (Aaron, 1968). By 1861, he concluded that the vast majority of men at all times are "imbeciles" held down by "gravity, custom and fear" until awakened by the personal ascendency of the "plus man." In this connection, we may recall that Friedrich Nietzsche was an avid reader of Emerson, and that the "plus man" mentioned in Emerson’s ([1860] 1929, V.5: 58) essay on "Power" bears more than a curious resemblance to Nietzsche’s own "superman."

It was Carlyle’s study of heroes and hero worship which had the greatest influence on Emerson’s own thinking. There was, in fact, "everything in Emerson’s philosophy to turn him like Carlyle [with whom Emerson was personally acquainted] into a prophet of reaction and the leadership principle" (Miller, 1953: 38). But Emerson never did follow directly in Carlyle’s path. Committed to the ideals enshrined in his native Concord, he concluded that the vulgarity of the democratic masses could never justify the repudiation of republican principle.

Transplanted in New England soil, Europe’s political romanticism bore new fruit. Far from formulating his own version of the Führerprinzip, Emerson believed the great man to be a model for society’s self-improvement. However, the quality of this model underwent change during the course of Emerson’s life.

Prior to the late-1830’s, Emerson’s thinking moved in contrary directions. Although bound to the classical-republican image of the restrained, politically disinterested, rational leader, he was more than ready to pay respect to leaders who displayed the romantic virtues, like spontaneity, willfullness and intuition (Barzun [1943] 1961). "Heroism," he then declared ([1841] 1901: 185), "feels, never reasons." The latter notion fits nicely beside Carlyle’s romantic criterion of "sincerity" as the essence of greatness. The young Emerson could also appreciate the Carlylean philosophy of history, and did so when he asserted ([1841] 1901: 45): "An institution is the lengthened shadow of one man." But he could find no place in his own thought for Carlyle’s moral neutrality. The romantic elements in Emerson’s early conception of the hero were therefore qualified, and usually subordinated, to the image drawn by Plutarch ("heroism’s doctor and historian"), with whom Emerson, like other young scholars of his time, was thoroughly familiar (for detail, see Berry, 1961). Not in the shattering expression of genius and will, he thought, but in their restraint by duty and morality is to be found the solid base for human greatness. Possessed by this classical vision, Emerson was bound to see the hero mainly as a moral exemplar. Lacking the nobility, serenity, restraint and stoicism of the Plutarchian hero, the grand technical virtuosi—Bacon, Napoleon, and Goethe—failed the youthful Emerson’s (1835) "Tests of Great Men."

By the time Emerson began preparing his essays on representative men, which were published in 1850, he had changed his mind. No longer did he measure individual greatness by an absolute moral canon; instead he made greatness relative to the prevailing standards of society, whatever their moral quality might be (for detail on this transformation, see McCormick [1953]). But the change did not come on suddenly. As early as 1826, Emerson noted in his journal that "geniuses are the organs, the mouthpieces of
their age; [they] do not speak their own words, nor think their own thoughts.\” Though quite inconsistent with his other early writings (yet typical of the \“push and pull of contrary directions in his thought\” [Whicher, 1953: vii]), this statement is prophetic of the later Emerson’s receptiveness to the ideas of Victor Cousin.

Considered by many to have had a major influence on Emerson during the 1830’s, Cousin, a French historian, defined the great man as one who personifies the \“common type\” which emerges out of any complex social order. Reinforcing an existing commitment to transcendental doctrine, a doctrine which defines each individual as a symbol of a higher order of reality, Cousin’s insight is incorporated into a group of essays deliberately prepared by Emerson as an alternative to Carlyle’s Heroes and Hero Worship (Mathiesen, 1941: 632; Harris, 1978: 97). Here, in Representative Men (1859) [1829], Emerson means to show how the hero incarnates, by accentuation, what is central in our society, and in ourselves. He presents the hero not as someone to be worshipped as a maker of history, as Carlyle would have it, or fatalistically acknowledged as an instrument of history, as Hegel would insist, but rather as someone to be exploited by his admirers and followers—as the preface to Emerson’s essays, \“The Uses of Great Men\”, makes clear.

To say that the great man is exploited by society is not to say that his conduct takes its cue from society. On the contrary, the great man, as Emerson depicts him, is a fiercely independent and supremely self-confident figure (see \“Self-Reliance\” [1841] 1901). The point is that his attributes make for greatness only when they are recognized by society as being useful for the realization of its own purposes. This coincidence between personal qualities and social needs is the precondition for the leader’s becoming a mirror through which society becomes conscious of itself.\4

Although Representative Men denies nothing to heroes of inferior moral stripe, its message is never morally neutral. Unlike Carlyle, who overlooked the hero’s moral faults if he was \“sincere,\” Emerson forgave nothing. He was willing only to acknowledge what immorality represents. Thus Napoleon is named a representative man because he possessed the vices as well as the virtues of the French middle class and its European allies: he was as unscrupulous as he was imaginative; as slanderous and selfish as he was industrious and skillful; as essentially malevolent as acquisitive, competitive, and bold. \“He interests us,\” says Emerson, (1850) 1900: 220–221), \“as he stands for France . . . only as far as the Revolution, or the interest of the industrious masses, found an organ and a leader in him. . . . [H]is real strength lay in their conviction that he was their representative in his genius and aims.\”\5 But having said this, Emerson hastens to point out the contrasting aspects of human nature to which different heroes appeal. An absolute distinction between vice and virtue is thus retained. \“It is the delight of vulgar talent,\” says Emerson ((1850) 1900: 16), \“to dazzle and to blind the beholder.\” Napoleon, who led his followers to ruin, is the best example. By contrast, \“true genius seeks to defend us from itself . . . These men correct the delirium of animal spirits, make us considerate and engage us in new aims and powers. The veneration of mankind selects these for the highest place\” (Emerson, (1850) 1900: 16, 18). Washington, who through his own serene indifference to political power led his followers to salvation, is the best example. Here one finds Plutarch’s classic republican leader appealing to the highest and most rational part of human nature:

Sword and staff, or talents sword-like or staff-like, carry on the work of the world. But I find him greater when he can abolish himself and all heroes, by letting in this element of reason, irrespective of persons,
this stabilizer and irresistible upward force... Then he is a monarch who gives a
constitution to his people; a pontiff who preaches the equality of souls and releases his servants from their
barbarous homages; an emperor who can spare his empire. (Emerson, [1850] 1900: 21)

In this last analysis, which defines the "true hero" as an embodiment of the values of
republican society, Emerson takes a position which is to be reworked by Charles Horton
Cooley.

A SOCIOLOGY OF REPRESENTATIVE MEN

Ralph Waldo Emerson's main writings on heroes and hero worship were undertaken
during America's "post heroic age" (Forgie, 1979). According to its critics, the onset of
this age in the late 1820's is marked not only by the final passing of most of the
revolutionary fathers but also by the naked pursuit of self-interest and by unprecedented
commercial expansion. Cooley's late nineteenth century environment accentuated every
feature of Emerson's early nineteenth century environment. In the post-Civil War years,
America grew from a weak, rural republic into a powerful, industrial democracy. While
many ideologues celebrated the material enrichment occasioned by this revolution, others
lamented its spiritual impoverishment (Rabinowitz, 1976). Cooley was one of these
critics. Like Emerson, Cooley saw the cult of the hero as a valuable instrument for the
elevation of morality and nationalism over commercial culture. In this regard, he also
shared Emerson's belief in the importance of social crisis. Emerson welcomed the Civil
War for revealing the "primary forces" which integrated the Union's separate economic
and political factions (cited in Chapman, [1897] 1957: 70). Cooley found in the Spanish-
American War heroic traits which occasioned a "fresh sense of community" and a
War I, which Cooley ardently supported, "makes us conscious of ourselves as a nation"
and strengthens the people's commitment to democratic ideals (Cooley, [1890-1929]
1918: 76).

Cooley's disdain for untrammeled capitalism and its culture, his intense patriotism and
devotion to democracy, were characteristic of the Progressive Movement’s reaction to
America's industrial revolution (Noble, 1970). That revolution had not fulfilled popular
aspirations for the good life; it brought instead acute problems: unregulated immigration
and urban growth, massive slums, decline in moral values and a widening gap between
rich and poor. In their search for means to deal with these problems, the progressives
discovered not only new programs but also a new understanding of man and society.
Against the prevailing assumptions of competitive individualism, progressive thinkers
like John Dewey, George Herbert Mead and Jane Addams affirmed the social self and the
ideal of community. Cooley's role in this development was substantial. In a way that has
persuaded generations of readers, says Philip Rieff (1964: ix), he destroyed once and for
all "the belief that human nature has some content and meaning superior to the social
order of which it is the representative conception.''

Cooley's idea of the social self, which directly informed his conception of the hero, was
not the product of Emerson's influence; it was a precondition of his susceptibility to it.
Yet, the fact of the influence itself is undeniable. Thinking, perhaps, of the sheer frequency
with which Emerson is cited in Cooley's works, Lewis Coser (1977: 318-319) recognized
that "Most of [Cooley's] writings stand under the shadow of this New England
philosopher.” Ample grounds for Coser’s statement are furnished by Cooley himself. He acknowledges his debt to Emerson for “guidance in my efforts to understand the world of men…” (1930: 4). In a term paper on Emerson, dated 1887, Cooley summarizes the virtues of Emerson’s writings and describes their influence on his own life: “I imagine that there is scarcely anyone who has felt his influence deeply who does not stand ready to say that he could better do without poets, philosophers, and men of letters than without this friend and aider” (p. 12). (A few years later, in 1891, Cooley made a pilgrimage to Emerson’s home.) To Emerson’s intellectual influence Cooley’s adolescent and adult journals make constant reference. In 1895, Emerson is designated “the great master of my thought” (Cooley [1890–1929] 1895: 9). Eleven years later, Cooley reflects back on his first book, Human Nature and the Social Order, and remarks that “The influence of Emerson is obvious” (1890–1929) 1906: 75). Cooley’s old diaries, too, were in hindsight “largely Emersonian” (1890–1929) 1906: 135). Thus while Cooley was attracted to other men of letters throughout his life (especially Macaulay and Goethe), none affected the style and substance of his own work as directly as did Emerson. Even at the end of his career, he revealed his “Emerson discipleship” to Robert Frost (who “thought it fine” [1890–1929] 1919: 74), and in his very last publication (1931: 66) Cooley declares: “I wore out a set of Emerson’s works when I was young, and even now I carry about a thin book of extracts to which I resort when I need to find a little more glamour on life.” Much of the “glamour” of which Cooley speaks was found in Emerson’s patriotism and in his writings on human greatness.

Cooley’s own interest in great men was animated by a peculiarity of his personal development. As a frail and withdrawn son of an eminent jurist,8 Cooley embarked early in life on a quest for fame.9 He was “passionately eager for applause” and frequently imagined himself in situations of which he was “the glorious hero.” His journals, especially the early volumes, are redundant with testimony, tediously detailed, of a consuming ambition and coldness of social affection, a disdain for the “commonplace man” and urgent desire to “communicate with great men.” Cooley recognizes the depth of his own self-centered ambition and repeatedly condemns himself for it. Yet, the darkness of what he calls his “underself” overrides him repeatedly, and is repeatedly denounced in a perpetual cycle of sin and repentance. From a deep-seated puritanical strain (derived, perhaps, from his grandfather’s New England background) is derived not only Cooley’s penchant for moral confession but also his disdain for “incontinence,” that is to say, sensuality, greed, power, and personal appetite. These same values shaped Cooley’s initial conception of the hero.

Convinced that society favors conformity and conspires against self-fulfillment, the youthful Cooley admired the individuality, strength, fierce feeling, and self-reliance of the Emersonian hero.10 He was impressed by the spectacle of personal force, but this image was fashioned according to a stoic, not romantic, ideal. Cooley celebrated soundness of will, rather than strength of will; he set above incontinent geniuses the “well regulated man” whose exercise of power is methodical, “self-possessed,” and serenely expressive of “contented inactivity.” Drawing explicitly on Emerson’s “tests of greatness,” Cooley dwells on motivation, not exploits. Breadth of vision, unselﬁshness, desire for truth rather than fame, and ﬁrm inner dedication to the quest for its own sake—these are the hallmarks of the Cooleyan hero (see [1890–1929] 1889: 38–40, 48; 1895: 39.) Cooley himself would have fallen short of this ideal; yet, the ideal itself, which conformed
closely to that classical republican mold which inspired Emerson, moved him deeply. So the parallels in Emerson’s and Cooley’s intellectual development run close.11 Applying an absolute moral standard to all candidates for greatness, the thoughts of young Cooley remind us of Emerson’s early writings. And by eventually adopting a more relativistic angle of vision, as he does in Human Nature and the Social Order, the maturing Cooley brings to mind the Representative Men of Emerson’s middle years.

The final parallel is procedural. Like Emerson, Cooley makes no attempt to delineate the various forms of heroism. Political, military, and spiritual leaders whose roles are directly oriented to the historical domain are placed in the same category as speculative thinkers and men of letters, whose achievements move history in more subtle ways. The reader is left to make the distinctions. Cooley wants to get straight to the unifying element.

Begin with a characteristic perception: “While there is infinite variety in leadership . . . there is, nevertheless, a likeness of principle everywhere present. . . . We may always expect to find a human nature sufficiently broad and sound to be felt as representative.” In this passage from Cooley’s first book ([1902] 1964: 340), his debt to Emerson is manifest. But if Human Nature and the Social Order was “written at a time when Emerson’s influence was predominant in Cooley’s life” (Jandy, 1942: 42), it took on additional significance in the context of Cooley’s effort to exploit the full implications of William James’ conception of the “social self.” Here Cooley enlarges upon Emerson by conceiving great men as something more than external objects to be “used” by society for its own purposes. Great men become socially significant only as they are internalized in the consciousness of their admirers as “personal ideas.” But since the hero is no more than an idea in the minds of his admirers, his fame is always “on loan” by society and subject to withdrawal at its own convenience.

Thus conceived, the hero is somewhat diminished. Acknowledging the social utility of the great man’s symbolic role, Emerson never forgot the brilliance and power with which this role is performed. Emerson was too romantic ever to deny genius its due. This aspect of Emerson’s thought affected Cooley, but it never really rubbed off on him. For Cooley, the pragmatic element in Emerson’s symbolic realism outweighed—indeed, negated—its romanticism. And Emerson’s pragmatism became all the more salient for Cooley through the further influence of William James.

What counts in James’ philosophy is not reality itself but what we make of it. The true is the useful, says James, and nothing is useful in things but what our mind adds to them. These ideas find direct expression in Cooley’s image of the hero. The heroic leader, Cooley admits ([1902] 1964: 354), may affect the course of history, but he does so only by representing the existing tendencies of social life. Accordingly, “leadership is not a final explanation of anything” ([1902] 1964: 357)—a conclusion which follows from Cooley’s initial premise that “the prime condition of ascendency is the presence of undirected energy in the person over whom it is to be exercised; it is not so much forced upon us from without as demanded from within” ([1902] 1964: 319). From his very first study in social psychology (“Genius, Fame and the Comparison of Races” [Cooley, 1897]—an essay which denies that perfect correlation of genius and fame that Francis Galton takes for granted12), Cooley saw human greatness only in the context of collective needs and interests; he therefore believed (much more strongly than did Emerson) that the use we make of the great man far outweighs the virtue of the man himself. Like truth, the
great man is created, not discovered. Cooley was too much of a pragmatist ever to deny social utility its full due.

Cooley knew about William James' own approach to this issue, but he never took it seriously. On this score, James was not pragmatic enough. He compared the social role of great men to the anomalies through which biological evolution occurs. This kind of analogical reason (which nicely illustrates James's tendency to be "mystically social, but not organically or intelligibly so" ([1890–1929] 1921: 47–8), awkwardly sidesteps the main question: Why does "the environment," as James puts it, react to innovation as it does? More directly, why does society venerate the achievement of some men and ignore or reject the achievement of others?

The first step in Cooley's approach to this question is to make an inventory of personal qualities often found in extraordinary men: instrumental genius, "patent personality," and that intense individualism which "Emerson's essay on self-reliance only formulates" (Cooley [1902] 1964: 328). These qualities are rare and precious, but they make for greatness only when they express the tendencies of "current human life," that is to say, when they are "representative." But Cooley pushes the idea of representativeness further than Emerson did. Having already determined that public identity is contrived out of social definitions, he takes exception to his mentor's belief in commanding talent and inherent personal magnetism as necessary conditions of representative greatness. If the famous and admired partake of the nature of gods, Cooley announces, it is not always of their own doing but often solely a result of the idealizing imagination of their beholder, who seeks ever to personify his own dispositions:

[T]he fame and power of a man often transcend the man himself, that is to say, the personal idea associated by the world with a particular name and presence has often little basis in the mind behind that name and presence, as it appears to cool and impartial study. The reason is that the function of the great and famous man is to be a symbol, and the real question in other minds is not so much, What are you? as What can I believe you are? What can you help me to feel and be? How far can I use you as a symbol in the development of my instinctive tendency? (Cooley [1902] 1964: 341)

With these words, Cooley dismisses James' "natural genius," amplifies Emerson's point on the transcendental character and symbolic functions of great men, and disparages further the romantic notion of the hero as a maker of history.

Yet from its deification of even ordinary men society draws great dividends. Emerson would not have fully understood this point. He saw the hero's utility in terms of the people's need for examples and guides to proper conduct. Society, he thought, benefits from a good model. For Cooley ([1902] 1964: 113), it is the model that initially connects us to society. Whatever his moral or instrumental worth, the hero's ultimate significance is as a medium through which an otherwise remote and intangible social order becomes visible:

The idea of country is a rich and various one and has connected with it many sensuous symbols—such as flags, music, and the rhythm of patriotic poetry—that are not directly personal; but it is chiefly an idea of personal traits that we share and like as set over against others that are different and repugnant. We think of rational traits by imagining the people that embody them.

Affirming the representative man's capacity to awaken "strong emotions" associated with such transcendent social entities, Cooley ([1902] 1964: 114) comes close to recog-
nizing the sacred as an integrating force in society. Emerson's frequently professed belief in the affinity between national feeling, religious sentiment, and hero worship forms part of the context for Cooley's insight. In his essay on "Worship" ([1859] 1929: 216), for example, Emerson observed that "when there was any extraordinary power of performance, when great national movements began, when arts appeared, where heroes existed... the human soul was in earnest, and had fixed its thoughts on spiritual verities." Cooley ([1902] 1964: 314) went further, declaring that "Hero worship merges insensibly into that devotion to ideal persons that is called religious." Precisely, "Hero worship is a kind of religion, and religion, insofar as it conceives persons, is a kind of hero worship." Stressing the sacred character of the great man, Emerson and Cooley reiterate an idea that was central to Carlyle's thought. The convergence, however, admits of opposite priorities. For Carlyle (1966: 12), the sacred is incarnate in the hero himself and religion is a derivative of hero worship. For Emerson, the moralist, hero worship is most surely a derivative of religion, broadly conceived. Cooley, on the other hand, derives religion and hero worship from a third element: the intrinsically social nature of human thought and sentiment (1902: 314). Tracing the roots of the sacred to social realities which transcend even the greatest of individuals, Emerson and Cooley strip the hero of his inherently godlike character. Each in his own light sees in the collective consciousness of society the source of that divine spirit which the political romantics of Europe find only in their great men.

Conceived in this way, religious sentiments bring heroes directly to the service of tradition. Here is a counterpart to another romantic notion, best expressed by Weber, who defines the great man as a radical who works against tradition. Unlike Weber, Cooley saw great men not as repudiators but as embodiments of the past. On this point Emerson was ambivalent, but he never doubted its merit or significance. Society's debt to the heroes of its past is a theme that reappears throughout his writings. But if tradition secures for the present generation its intellectual resources and moral stability, it can also undermine its self-reliance and initiative. The lament carries traces of the romantic. "Our age," Emerson ([1836] 1963a: 21-22) complains, "is retrospective. It builds the sepulchres of the fathers. It writes biographies, histories, and criticism. The foregoing generations beheld god and nature face to face; we, through their eyes... Why should we grope among the dry bones of the past, or put the living generation into masquerade out of its faded wardrobe?" A somewhat less romantic Cooley found the yoke of history to be more serviceable than did Emerson. In Social Process (1918), Cooley devotes a distinctly pragmatist essay on fame—"the extended leadership," as he called it—to show how heroes of the past as well as the present articulate the instant concerns and needs of society. Enduring over time through a commemorative cult which idealizes their virtues and activities, heroes play an important part in maintaining the traditionality of the present. Reciprocally (and here Cooley reiterates his insistence on the priority of appearance over substance), tradition helps make the hero:

It is because fame exists for our present use and not to perpetuate a dead past that myth enters so largely into it. What we need is a good symbol to help us think and feel; and so, starting with an actual personality which more or less meets this need, we gradually improve upon it by a process of unconscious adaptation that omits the inessential and adds whatever is necessary to round out the ideal. Thus the human mind working through tradition is an artist, and creates types which go beyond nature.

(Cooley, 1918: 116)
Manufactured from material of the past, these heroic types perform an essentially religious function: they connect the individual to the standards and aspirations of his society; they serve as a check against egocentrism; they promote the feeling "that there is a larger and more enduring life surrounding, appreciating, upholding the individual, and guaranteeing that his sacrifices and efforts will not be in vain . . . something that relieves the precariousness of the merely private self" (Cooley, 1918: 139, see also p. 418). Many inquiries, including Durkheim's (1912), have explored the religious qualities of this larger and more endearing life; but Cooley alone has found these qualities to bear strong affinity with democracy. Religion, says Cooley ([1909] 1962: 373) lives only "by communication and influence;" it requires "some sort of fostering community life." Connecting men to one another and to the larger whole more securely than any other form of political organization, democracy is regarded as a supporting beam in the infrastructure of religion. There can be no complete Christianity, Cooley explains, without democracy (Journals, 1918, p. 159).

Embodying the societal connections previously rooted the church, democracy becomes the religion which hero worship affirms. Much of Emerson is borne in this assumption. If heroism was the "medium" of Emerson's legacy, an assessment of the limits and possibilities of democracy was an important part of its "message." To read and revise this message was to be the final element in Cooley's legacy.

"On reading Mr. Bryce's 'America Revisited,'" Cooley admits to his journal ([1890–1929]1905: 21), "'I shed tears. God knows why. I suppose I identify myself with my country and with the hopes of mankind therein embodied.'" Some years later he would announce, "'I would think for America'" ([1890–1929]1921: 48). In doing so, he displayed publicly toward Nietzsche the same respectful contempt that Emerson privately felt toward Carlyle. Nietzsche's "incomprehension of democracy and feeling that 'the herd' must have a master" reflects, in Cooley's view, "a mind which itself lacked poise and common sense" (1931: 125).

In the great man Nietzsche found a means of salvation from democracy. Cooley's concern was not to deny the claim that great men subvert democracy, but that democracy subverts the development of those qualities which make men great. Human Nature and the Social Order is the starting point of Cooley's analysis. Transforming the great man into the representative man, Cooley takes a first step toward democratizing greatness itself. In Social Organization (1909) 1962), he takes the second step by repudiating Gustav LeBon, who, 'like Nietzsche, saw great men as the superior masters of the crowd. This conception, says Cooley, applies only to 'fixed orders,' or societies with strong authoritarian traditions, of which LeBon's own France is prototypical ([1909] 1962: 153–156). Self-control and rational judgment predominate among the masses in societies with strong democratic (and anti-aristocratic) traditions. In these societies, the masses contribute no leading ideas; but they do contribute moral sentiments and indicate preferred directions for action, seeking to realize their ends by the choice of effective leaders. Democracy, then, does not have a levelling effect on individual talents, as Emerson feared and many of Cooley's contemporaries thought; rather, democracy's uniqueness is that it promotes in any situation the fullest use of the talents and leadership needed (Cooley [1909] 1962: 121–148).

A new emphasis now appears in Cooley's work. His initial focus on the symbolic hero is widened enough to incorporate, in his later writing on democracy, a more explicit
appreciation of instrumental talents and achievement. Yet, Cooley displayed very little of Emerson's fascination with genius itself. In fact, Cooley never dwells on the particulars of his heroes' qualities. However explicit their recognition, these qualities continue to interest Cooley mainly insofar as they are venerated, and insofar as this veneration betrays the values of society.

Cooley's main point is that the virtuosity of the American hero does not translate into the dramatic "presence" celebrated by LeBon. Reaffirming Emerson's disdain for the "animal spirits" aroused by "vulgar talent," Cooley ([1902] 1964: 326) declares that histrionic display appeals to the "childlike" mentalities most likely to be found in the "fixed orders" of Europe. A prime example, in this respect, is the German mind, which is "slow, reveres authority, is undemocratic, distrusting the average man . . . and has a passion for self-surrender." By contrast, the cardinal American virtue is "self-possession," which is related to the "practical self-reliance" required in a democracy ([1890-1929]1914: 30). Correspondingly, America's heroes represent the modest virtues of the primary group rather than the grandeur of the state. Unlike the vulgar great (which include Napoleon, whom Cooley [1930: 204] designated a "moral defective"), "the great men of democracy are homely men, men who stand for simple ideals of the family and neighborhood group—notably Abraham Lincoln" ([1890-1929]1907: 125). Emerson, who was committed more deeply to the early republic than to post-Jacksonian democracy, would have made a similar point, but he would have used the quiet, aristocratic dignity of Washington rather than the colorful, "just plain folks" demeanor of Lincoln (of which he disapproved) to illustrate it. Despite this difference, Emerson and Cooley were both patriots, both wrote with America in mind, and, for the most part, both were convinced that the great men of their land incarnated the New World's highest ideals and aspirations.

CONCLUSION

Cooley's youthful lust for applause and fame led him to take an interest in heroes before he ever read Emerson. And it was Cooley's own conception of the social person, itself a product of the progressive era's reaction against nineteenth century individualism, that led him to regard the great man as a symbol rather than an architect of society. Had Emerson never lived, therefore, Cooley would have probably developed his ideas about heroes and their veneration along lines similar to those he actually followed. That Cooley would have expressed these ideas at so great a length and with as much clarity and force is doubtful. In Emerson's philosophy Cooley found the intellectual justification and inspiration that made human greatness a major part of his life's work. By the same token, Emerson's own ideas did not emerge from direct observation alone but were formulated against a background of romantic and republican notions of power, authority, and human nature. The deeper significance of Emerson's insights, and, through his influence, those of Cooley, derives from this background.

Rooted in the symbolic realism of nineteenth century transcendentalist thought, the representative theory of heroic leadership bears no intrinsic affinity to democratic principles. All great men are representative men in that they personify the ideals of their society, whether that society be authoritarian or democratic. The critical question, therefore, is the great man's relation to that which he symbolizes, and it was by recognizing this question
that Emerson and Cooley reconciled hero worship to democracy. The significance of the representative man for democracy is that, however much he contributes to their realization, the values and aspirations he stands for are derived from his society and not the other way around. Counterposed to the passionate, intellectually vacuous following whose will is molded by the Nietzschean autocrat, the American hero is recognized by a critical population which sees in him what is essential in itself.

This normative element—the hero’s relation to the moral tenets of democracy—is the distinguishing concern of Emerson and Cooley, but it has been lost sight of by their successors. Contemporary American sociologists, like Orrin Klapp (1962, 1964), adopt their forebears’ analytic premises—the hero as a symbol of his society’s dispositions—but they leave behind the corresponding normative premises. The sociological approach to symbolic leadership is no longer directly concerned with the traits which make great men representative of democratic, as opposed to authoritarian, values. This approach remains tied to the “symbolic realism” of transcendentalist doctrine, but it ignores the political ideals that Emerson and Cooley used to bend that doctrine to the service of democracy.

Yet, the representative virtues which Americans demand of their great men, no less than the rational self-direction they demand of themselves, are as vital in the twentieth century as they were in the nineteenth. Americans continue to feel that great men must be representative men. In his (1941) essay, “How Americans Choose Their Heroes,” historian Dixon Wecter declares: “In a democracy, where the favorite should rightly be the people’s choice—and not the elect of hereditary honors or of a myth-making ‘party’ leadership—he is an index to the collective mind and heart.” Likewise, Daniel Boorstin (1962: 50) points out that America’s most admired leaders have always possessed a common touch. “We revere them not because they possess charisma, divine favor, a grace or talent granted them by God, but because they embody popular virtues. We admire them, not because they reveal God, but because they reveal and elevate ourselves.” Robert Penn Warren reiterates this point in his preface to the 1972 reissue of Wecter’s work. The hero, says Warren (1972: xxiii), “must be powerful enough to protect his people, but the power thus exercised is depersonalized and becomes a creation, as it were, of the need and the will of the people. This is the mystery of democracy” (see also Hook, 1943: 229–245). Recognizing that “the need and the will of the people” must be represented in the hero’s motives as well as his exploits, the mystery resolves itself. In a passage which reminds us of Cooley, Wecter (1941: 485) observes that “ordinary Americans believe that character is more important than brains. Hard work, tenacity, enterprise, and firmness in the face of odds are the qualities that Americans most admire, rather than originality or eloquence of tongue and pen.” And in another passage, this reminiscent of Cooley’s disdain for the childlike mentality of the European, Wecter (1941: 486) asserts that “At the boy’s level, [hero] worship gravitates toward the doer of spectacular deeds . . . [but] in the eyes of a more critical judgement toward idealism and moral qualities.” No wonder that the “homely man” who Cooley thought best embodied the simple virtues of America—Abraham Lincoln—is still regarded, according to expert and general opinion polls, as the greatest man America ever produced.13 This attitude, along with the broader convictions on which it is based, testifies to the endurance of America’s heroic vision and to the continuing relevance of those who first articulated that vision in sociological terms.
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NOTES

1. These writings were ripe for fascist picking during the third and fourth decade of the twentieth century. Michels, a cultural minister in Mussolini's government, was not displeased to find his work thus exploited. Weber, on the other hand, would have probably disapproved of the service in which the German fascists placed his ideas. Yet, it is reasonable to claim that his work (not to mention his political opinions) lent themselves to such use (Bendix, 1962: 471–472).

2. The ultimate source of this conception is found in the radically anti-authoritarian "Real Whig" tradition of late seventeenth and early eighteenth century England (Schwartz, 1983). Adapted to the political realities of colonial America, this tradition promotes intense suspicion of every form of power, designates virtue as the sine qua non of political greatness, and defines the ideal leader as an agent of the community who displays the traditional republican qualities: "disinterested" in political power, subordination of instrumentality to communal authority, control of desire by conscience and intellect. In this scheme there is no room for the strong-willed charismatic dictator, or even the elected chief of Weber's "leader democracy" (Führerdemokratie).

3. Although Cooley has been assigned a prominent place in the history of sociological thought, he is known mainly from a "prescientist" perspective (Lottes, 1977), which insists the scholar to select out of his total writings those which relate to contemporary interests, like "the self" and the "primary group," but to ignore other statements, however central these may have been to the concerns of Cooley himself. In consequence, sociologists have overlooked Cooley's running commentary on the social role of cultural and political heroes, a topic which, in Cooley's (1897: 1) own words, touches "the very root problem of sociology," namely, "the mutual relations of the individual and the social order."

4. Correspondingly, there can be nothing inherent in genius that permanently sustains itself; certain qualities may satisfy the needs of a given age, but "other days will demand other qualities" (Emerson, 1850: 29). Yet, by denying the certainty that such demand will be met, Emerson refutes a claim advanced by Hegel and enlarged by Marx and Engels: that history invariably poses only such problems as it is itself capable of solving. Thus does Emerson reaffirm the positive role of the individual in history.

5. If Napoleon represented the manifest aspirations of his time, Goethe expressed its deep, inner qualities. Goethe is described as a courtier and aristocrat of the "velvet life," a man of "vicious egoism" who dwelt too much in the world of sensuality and too little in the world of morality. Condemnable as Goethe may have been as a man, adds Emerson, the domination of his moral character by his intellect must be seen as a perfect representation of the ruling psychological traits of his society (Emerson [1850] 1900: 239–267; see also Wahr, 1971).

6. Jane Addams' influential Democracy and Social Ethics (1916: 272) contrasted competitive individualism with the "exhilaration and uplift which come when the individual sympathy and intelligence are [realized] in connection with the activity of the many." John Dewey, perhaps the most widely read critic of nineteenth century individualism, condemned the capitalist system for placing artificial restraints on man's social and altruistic nature. He also extolled the virtues of democracy and criticized efforts to induce through education the people's subordination to the power of small elites. Against one such elite Dewey would urge, in 1914, that America go to war (Noble, 1970: 53–64). George Herbert Mead was another personification of the progressive epoch. He not only refined Dewey's and Cooley's conceptions of the social self but also shared their belief in democracy as both an instrument for reform and a design for collective life. Mead, too, regarded the war against Germany as a just defense of democratic ideals (Burger and Deegan, 1981). It was mainly the matter of activist that these progressive social thinkers distinguished themselves from Cooley. Since Cooley did not regard himself as an agent of social reform, he never participated in community life as fully as did Addams, Dewey, and Mead (Diner, 1980). Settlement houses, laboratory schools, labor disputes, and other arenas for the exercise of social democracy were out of his line. Yet, his many comments on the programs of the Progressive Era, including Jane Addams', show that he strongly believed in them. (See also Coser, 1978: 308.)

7. The paper is simply headed "Charles H. Cooley (Tues. & Fri.)."

8. Cooley's father was not sympathetic to the progressive movement. His writings expounded a philosophy of law which justified absolute property rights, and, as a staunch defender of social Darwinism, he denied the nonproperty holder's need for or right to compassion. Yet, he was a kind and indulgent father and there is every
reason to believe that Charles' feelings toward him were affectionate. A perceptive psychologist might be able to
determine from Charles' personal documents whether he identified with his father and tried to be like him in
some respects. That Charles was deeply impressed by his father's reputation, and obsessed with the prospect of
achieving renown for himself, are facts which bear on this question (for detail, see Dibble, 1980).

9. "From my very infancy to the present day," Cooley reveals, "I have always had intense ambition,
which led me to figure a splendid future in some form or other: This [in adolescence] presented itself as political
leadership, not lingering at any minor eminence but proceeding at once and as of course to a pitch of power and
glory of which history showed no previous example. Julius Caesar's notions of personal greatness were not a bit
more exorbitant than mine, nor more seriously and tenaciously entertained. . . . [In consequence], "all through
my early life the discrepancy between my ambitions and my actual state was great and often painful" (1930: viii,
x). Adulthood brought no relief. Cooley was bitterly resentful of others' success in matters of salary and
promotion (1910: 88, 1903: 117), and complained that even his own successes, like Human Nature
and the Social Order, did not bring him as much fame as he hoped (1910: 88, 1907: 139). Not before late
middle age do these kinds of disappointments disappear from his journals.

10. In his (1887) term paper, Cooley is struck by the way "This mild mannered descendent of many
clergymen admires strong and independent men; hardly less than Carlyle himself." He goes on to say that self-
reliance is "the bottom fact" of Emerson's work (p. 5).

11. Parallels in personal development are also evident. Like Cooley, Emerson was cold and unresponsive in
his social relations. As a youth he suffered from chronic illness, yet was possessed by a burning desire for
success and fame. This kind of recognition eluded him, as it did Cooley, until his late thirties.

12. Cooley disputed Frances Galton's claim that advanced cultures are based on superior genetic endow-
ment; however, he did not deny the existence of genetic differences between some groups. In his journal (1890-
1929: 135) he indicates: "I do not believe in the natural equality of races. . . ." Although one cannot
separate potential ability and social heritage, "it seems to me that the different behavior of race groups in past
history and at the present time points strongly to deep-seated differences among them."

13. Book and periodical indexes show that two figures have dominated America's historical imagination.
Most often written about during the past hundred years is Abraham Lincoln. A close second is Emerson's
favorite: George Washington. The number of books and articles devoted to other figures in American history do
not even come close to the number written about these two men—and the pattern is as marked today as it was at
the turn of the century. As to the substance of the writings, Washington continues to be distinguished by his vast
moral virtues; personal magnetism and instrumental genius play no part in his veneration. Likewise, the
principal reasons why a national sample rated Lincoln above Washington include few references to superiority of
talent. Lincoln was the better man because "He was a greater humanitarian, more down to earth, more of a
people's President" (Gallup, 1945: 489). The passage of time has not altered this assessment. In 1958,
Americans chose Lincoln as the famous man in history they would most like to invite to dinner (Gallup, 1958:
1560). And from the 1951 Who's Who in America survey to the 1982 Chicago Tribune survey, Lincoln is rated
by leading experts as the nation's greatest President. Washington usually ranks second. (Gallup, 1951: 986;
Chicago Tribune, January 10, 1982).

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